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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Reyes has raised various trial errors on appeal, including that the district court
(1) erred by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant and highly prejudicial propensity evidence
of a previous altercation with his wife, and (2) abused its discretion by declaring Ms. Reyes
unavailable and admitting her preliminary hearing testimony even though she was under defense
counsel's subpoena and actually appeared at trial. On the first issue, the State partially concedes
error, doesn't address the bulk of Mr. Reyes's arguments, and attempts to prove the error is
harmless by lowering its burden of proof to an overwhelming evidence standard. On the second
issue, the State's arguments mirror the erroneous reasoning of the district court-that Ms. Reyes
was avoiding the service of process and it shouldn't have had to bear the risk of whether
Ms. Reyes actually appeared as promised by defense counsel-and it again relies on the
incorrect overwhelming evidence standard, as well as various illusory procedural hurdles, to
attempt to meet its burden of proving the error was harmless. Those arguments are unavailing.
The district court made various erroneous rulings which allowed the State to paint
Mr. Reyes as a bad person, a wife-batterer, a repeat offender, and someone who is feared by
those who know him. The State has failed to show that each of these errors individuallyincluding two errors the State has admitted occurred-did not contribute to the verdicts, and
Mr. Reyes has shown that the accumulation of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. This
Court should vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err and abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce
irrelevant and highly prejudicial propensity evidence regarding alleged instances in which
Mr. Reyes did not follow his ''usual" practice of locking himself in his room during an
argument with his wife?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Reyes' s preliminary hearing
testimony because Ms. Reyes was available for trial and thus her preliminary hearing
testimony was inadmissible hearsay?

III.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant evidence that
Mr. Reyes was on probation at the time of these alleged crimes and thus should not have
been in a bar or drinking alcohol?

IV.

Did the district court err by admitting Ms. Neri's irrelevant testimony about how she
asked officers not to tell Mr. Reyes she had called 911?

V.

Did the district court err by allowing the prosecutor to imply in closing that Ms. Reyes
did not testify because she was scared and was reluctant to testify?

VI.

Should this Court vacate Mr. Reyes's judgment of conviction because, even if these
errors are individually harmless, together they deprived Mr. Reyes of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process and a fair trial? 1

1

This reply brief addresses only issues I, II, and VI.
2

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred And Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce
Irrelevant And Highly Prejudicial Propensity Evidence Regarding Alleged Instances In Which
Mr. Reyes Did Not Follow His "Usual" Practice Of Locking Himselfln His Room During An
Argument With His Wife
In response to Mr. Reyes' s challenge to the admission of irrelevant propensity evidence
regarding alleged instances in which Mr. Reyes did not follow his "usual" practice of locking
himself in his room during an argument with his wife, the State contends that evidence of his
failure to do so another time was relevant to Mr. Reyes' s credibility, admits that the district court
erred by allowing evidence of the related criminal charges, and fails to address the bulk of
Mr. Reyes's arguments. (Resp. Br., pp.12-17.) The State then argues an incorrect harmless
error test in an attempt to save the convictions in this case.

(Resp. Br., pp.17-20.) The State's

efforts fail on all accounts.

A.

The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To "Impeach" Mr. Reyes With Evidence
Of Instances In Which He Did Not Follow His "Usual" Practice Of Locking Himself In
His Room During An Argument With His Wife
The State incorrectly contends that evidence that Mr. Reyes did not always follow his

''usual" practice of locking himself in his room during a fight with his wife was relevant to
impeach Mr. Reyes. First, the State begins with the red herring that "Rule 404(b) does not
prohibit the admission of evidence that a witness lied."

(Resp. Br., p.13.)

To be clear,

Mr. Reyes did not lie. He told the jury what he "usually" does: "[W]hen I argue with my wife, I
usually close the door." (Tr., p.578, Ls.18-20 (emphasis added).) One who "usually" does

something, even accepting the State's definition of the term to be "as a rule," does not always do
it. (Resp. Br., p.16.)

3

Second, despite the State's reliance on State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496 (1999), and

State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584 (Ct. App. 1991), those cases do not support its position. (Resp.
Br., pp.13-16.) This Court in Hairston held that, "[o]nce Hairston testified that he had not fired
the gun prior to January 6th, that he had never seen anyone shot before, and that he had never
pointed a gun at anyone, the Colorado evidence [that Hairston had shot a convenience store clerk
in Colorado two days prior] became relevant to impeach his credibility." 133 Idaho at 502-03
(emphasis added). In other words, evidence that Hairston had done something he testified he had

never done was admissible to impeach that testimony. Id. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in
Arledge held that a witness's statement that Arledge "had gotten out of jail yesterday" was
admissible to impeach the witness's testimony that Arledge had been "residing" with the witness
for "about two days." 119 Idaho at 587-88. Although not a direct contradiction, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that the witness's statement "cast doubt [on the witness's] testimony implying
that Arledge was residing in the home up until the time of the incident." Id. at 588 (emphasis
added). Here, on the other hand, Mr. Reyes' explanation of what he "usually" does is itself an
acknowledgement that he does not always do it. (Tr., p.578, Ls.18-20.) Evidence of instances
where he did not follow his usual practice of locking the door therefore could not go to impeach
his credibility. Instead, that evidence went purely to propensity-if Mr. Reyes was charged for
beating up his wife in the past, he probably did it again.
Third, it is worth noting what the State conceded or failed to address on this issue. It
conceded that the district court erred by allowing the jury to hear about the related criminal
charges. (Resp. Br., pp.12, 16-17.) And it did not challenge Mr. Reyes's assertion that the
prosecutor, Mr. Topmiller, improperly testified during this line of questioning thus committing

4

misconduct; 2 that Mr. Topmiller's "questions" were double or triple hearsay; that Mr. Topmiller
impermissibly relied on extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct; or that Mr. Topmiller
put pure propensity evidence in front of the jury by telling them that Mr. Reyes had been charged
in 2015 with three of the same offenses he faced that day. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-17; App.
Br., pp.15-16.) What's left is essentially an argument that Mr. Topmiller could have properly
impeached Mr. Reyes had Mr. Topmiller simply asked Mr. Reyes about times when he did not
follow his usual practice of locking himself in his bedroom during an argument with his wife.
Not only is that assertion incorrect, it's also not what happened. 3

The State's arguments

necessarily fail.

2

In its harmless error analysis, the State claims that Mr. Reyes did not assert that this amounted
to misconduct nor was a misconduct claim raised below. (Resp. Br., p.18 n.3.) To the contrary,
in his appellant's brief Mr. Reyes did assert that this amounted to misconduct (App. Br., pp.1516 (citing State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26 & n.4 (Ct. App. 2009), for the proposition that a
prosecutor who places facts not in evidence before the jury violates I.R.E. 603, the predecessor
to I.R.E. 103(d), "and also commits misconduct")), and explained these errors were preserved
because "under no circumstances was [Mr. Topmiller's] 'question' proper and the bases for that
objection are apparent from the context" (App. Br., pp.15 n.4 (citing State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 601-02 (2013)).
3
Similarly, as to the Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 analysis, the State simply argues that the
district court "limited the amount of prejudice by instructing the prosecutor not to connect the past
fight to 'any ... criminal charges' and by sustaining objections to limit the amount of testimony the
prosecutor could elicit so as to avoid 'retry[ing] the entire [past] incident."' (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)
To be clear, the jury wasn't present when the district court instructed Mr. Topmiller not to get into
other charges (Tr., p.583, L.2-p.594, L.15), but the jury was present when the court overruled
defense counsel's objection to Mr. Topmiller's "questions" about the 2015 police report (Tr., p.594,
L.15-p.596, L.21). The State's argument on prejudice is wholly meritless.
5

B.

The State Has Failed To Argue Harmlessness Under The Correct Standard, Much Less
Meet Its Burden Of Proving, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That The Erroneous
Admission Of This Evidence Did Not Contribute To The Verdicts

1.

This Court Should Reject The State's Proposed "Overwhelming Evidence"
Standard

The State acknowledges that it must prove '"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,"' (Resp. Br., p.17 (quoting

State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140 (2014) (emphasis added)), but goes on to contend that "the
error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error."' (Resp.
Br., p.17 (quoting State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46 (2017) (emphasis added)). It refers to

Montgomery as a "clear articulation" of the harmless error standard, points to a recent Court of
Appeals decision concluding that the language in Montgomery about whether the error ''would
be the same" is the correct standard (Resp. Br., p.17 n.2 (citing State v. Joslin, No. 45629 (Idaho
Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019)4) ), and asks this Court to affirm because it "presented overwhelming
evidence ofReyes's guilt" (Resp. Br., p.18).
To the contrary, Montgomery did not "articulate" the harmless error standard.

That

standard was set forth, after a thorough review of the history of harmless error, in State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008).

Although this Court has on occasion alluded to a

"hypothetical jury" or "overwhelming evidence" standard when describing harmless error, see,

e.g., Montgomery, 163 Idaho at 46 (citing State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013)), those
cases did not purport to alter the harmless error standard as articulated in Perry. Similarly, it is
irrelevant that the Court of Appeals has adopted an interpretation of harmless error that is at odds
with that adopted by this Court in Perry. As discussed below, the correct standard is whether the
4

A petition for review requesting that this Court correct the Court of Appeals' misinterpretation
of the harmless error standard is currently pending in Joslin.
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error contributed to the verdict, and not whether a hypothetical jury that did not hear the
challenged evidence would have convicted the defendant nor whether overwhelming evidence
supports the verdict. This Court should reject the State's proposed "overwhelming evidence"
test.
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears
the burden of proving, "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Contrary to the State's claim,
[t]he inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so,
because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter
how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the
jury-trial guarantee.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
To understand what the Chapman Court intended when it adopted a harmless-error
standard for cases of constitutional error, and what this Court intended when, in Perry, it adopted
the Chapman standard for all objected-to error in Idaho, it is worth looking at the historical
context in which the Chapman standard came into being.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American courts reversed a
conviction if any error at all was found on appeal. See John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless
Error Revisited, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 59, 67 (2016); see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 220 ("Prior to the
early twentieth century the doctrine of harmless error did not exist, and where error was found to
have occurred at trial, a reversal was necessitated in all cases."). In an effort to curtail the
automatic-reversal rule, Congress added § 269, a harmless-error provision, to the Judicial Code

7

in 1919. 5 Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme

Court's Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U KAN. L. REV. 309, 314 (2002); Roger A.
Fairfax, Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2033 (2008); Greabe, supra, at 67. "By 1926, eighteen states also had
enacted laws directing their appellate courts to ignore harmless errors, and ten more had
established some sort of similar rule by judicial pronouncement." Greabe, supra, at 68.
In Kotteakos v. United States, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
federal harmless error statute, which provided as follows:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in
any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of
the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946) (quoting § 269) (emphasis added). In doing so, the Court made it
abundantly clear that the harmless-error standard was not some sort of overwhelming-evidence
test, whereby the appellate court was to decide whether in a trial without the error, the defendant
surely would have been convicted:

[I]t is not the appellate court's function to determine guilt or innocence. Nor is it
to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the
speculation comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such impressions. But
they may not make them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance. Those judgments
are exclusively for the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence legally
sufficient to sustain the conviction unaffected by the error.

. . . And the question is, not were they right in their judgment, regardless of the
error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or
reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing
is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's
own, in the total setting.
5

The federal harmless-error statute still exists in substantially the same form. It is now codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2111. In addition, in 1946, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) was adopted
to implement § 269. Fairfax, supra, at 2034. That Rule provided as follows: "Any error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded." Id.
(quoting Rule 52(a)). Rule 52(a) is virtually identical today.
8

This must take account of what the error meant to them, not singled out
and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened. And one must judge
others' reactions not by his own, but with allowance for how others might react
and not be regarded generally as acting without reason. This is the important
difference, but one easy to ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from the
record.
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment
should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or
a specific command of Congress. But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is
impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry
cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the
phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had
substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot
stand.

Id. at 763-65 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Thereafter, the Court

explicitly rejected the government's contention that harmlessness ought to be judged by whether
an appellate court thinks the defendant is guilty:
The Government's theory seems to be, in ultimate logical reach, that the error
presented by the variance is insubstantial and harmless, if the evidence offered
specifically and properly to convict each defendant would be sufficient to sustain
his conviction, if submitted in a separate trial. For reasons we have stated and in
view of the authorities cited, this is not and cannot be the test under§ 269 ....

Id. at 767.

Likewise, it explicitly rejected the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' use of an

overwhelming-evidence test:
We have had regard also for the fact that the Court of Appeals
painstakingly examined the evidence relating directly to each of the petitioners;
found it convincing to the point of making guilt manifest; could not fmd
substantial harm or unfairness in the all-pervading error or in any particular phase
of the trial; and concluded that reversal would be a miscarriage of justice.

It may be, as the Court of Appeals found, that the evidence concerning
each petitioner was so clear that conviction would have been dictated and reversal
forbidden, if it had been presented in separate trials for each offense or in one or

9

more substantially similar to the Berger[ 6l trial in the number of conspiracies and
conspirators involved. But whether so or not is neither our problem nor that of
the Court of Appeals for this case. That conviction would, or might probably,
have resulted in [a] properly conducted trial is not the criterion of§ 269. We
think it highly probable that the error had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.

Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Kotteakos Court found that the error was not
harmless because it "permeated the entire charge, indeed the entire trial." Id. at 769.
Seventeen years after deciding Kotteakos, the Supreme Court addressed harmlessness in
the context of a constitutional violation. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). The Fahy
Court avoided the question that would ultimately be addressed in Chapman-whether an
automatic-reversal rules applies to all constitutional errors-because it found the error in that
case was not harmless, and so reversal was required regardless of whether the Court applied an
automatic-reversal rule. See id. at 86. In finding that the error in that case-the admission of
evidence obtained through a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights-was not
harmless, the Court employed the following standard:
We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which
the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of
The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.

Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added). Thus, again, the Court rejected the notion that harmlessness
depends on whether there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Four years later, the Court decided Chapman.

In Chapman, the Court held that

constitutional violations do not require an automatic-reversal rule, since even they can be
deemed harmless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22. More importantly for purposes of this case, the
Court went on to define the harmless-error standard for constitutional violations. It explicitly
rejected California's harmless-error standard, which was focused on the question of whether
6

Berger v. United States, 296 U.S. 78 (1935).
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there exists overwhelming evidence of guilt, and instead adopted the Fahy standard. 7 Id. at 23.
In applying the Fahy standard to the case at hand, the Chapman Court focused on the impact of
the error (repeated comments on the defendant's silence in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights) on the trial evidence and concluded that, although the evidence against the defendant was
"reasonably strong," the error could have swayed the jurors and, therefore, was not harmless. Id.
at 24-26.
In light of this historical perspective, it is clear that when the Chapman Court adopted a
harmless-error standard, it adopted one that calls for an evaluation of the likely effect of the error
on the jury's deliberations in the case at hand, not an evaluation of whether the defendant is
obviously guilty, such that in a hypothetical trial that might have occurred without the error, a
hypothetical jury would have convicted the defendant. Thus, although the Supreme Court has
certainly gotten away from the true meaning of the Chapman harmless-error standard at times
over the past 50 years, 8 in somewhat more recent times, it has reaffirmed that the Chapman
standard is not an overwhelming-evidence test:
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the jury
actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty
verdict that was never infact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings
to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee.
7

The Court cited with approval the "affect the substantial rights" standard of the federal
harmless-error statute interpreted in Kotteakos, and it suggested commonality between that
standard and the Fahy standard. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 ("[L]ike the federal harmlesserror statute, [the Fahy standard] emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those
constitutional errors that 'affect substantial rights' of a party."). While the Court noted that
California's statutory harmless-error rule also spoke in terms of an "affect" on the parties'
"substantial rights," because the California Supreme Court had given that statute an
interpretation emphasizing "overwhelming evidence," the Chapman Court distinguished, and
ultimately rejected, California's standard. See id. at 23 & n.6-7.
8
See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
11

Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the Chapman
inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review in the present case
[involving an erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction] becomes evident. Since,
for the reasons described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent.
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question
whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been
rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object,
so to speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an
appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-not that the jury's actual finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error. That is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more
than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed
verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury
finding of guilty.
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-80 (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
In Perry, this Court adopted the Chapman standard for all objected-to error in Idahowhether constitutional or otherwise:
In Idaho, the harmless error test established in Chapman is now applied to all
objected-to error.... In order to avoid confusion and promote equal application
of the law, Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless
error test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to,
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such an error
occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
150 Idaho at 221-22. In discussing the Chapman standard, this Court specifically noted that
Chapman had rejected California's overwhelming-evidence standard. Id. at 223. It also spoke
approvingly of Sullivan's interpretation of Chapman: "The Court concluded, 'the inquiry, in
other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error."' Id. (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279). And, although this Court
noted that, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme "Court backed away from
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the cut-and-dry rule established in Sullivan," when it held that the failure of a court to instruct the
jury on an element of the offense will be harmless if the "omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error," Perry, 150 Idaho at 224 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 17), it correctly
recognized that Neder merely carved out a narrow exception to the Chapman standard, see id. at
227-28 (explaining that the Chapman standard generally applies to objected-to error, but there is
an "exception[ ]" to this general rule "in the limited instance where" the trial court erroneously
failed to instruct the jury on one element, at which point the Neder standard applies).
In view of the historical development of the Chapman standard, and of this Court's
unmistakable language in Perry, it is clear that when the Court adopted the Chapman harmlesserror standard for all objected-to errors in Idaho, it adopted the true Chapman standard-a
standard that evaluates whether the error might have had an effect on the jury's deliberations in
the case at hand, not whether some hypothetical jury would find the defendant guilty in a
hypothetical trial that occurred without the error. As Justice Scalia wrote in Sullivan: "The
Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action
.... " 508 U.S. at 280. Accordingly, this Court should reject the State's attempts to lower its
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in this case did not contribute to the
verdicts actually rendered in this case.

2.

The State Has Not-And Could Not-Show That This Error Did Not Contribute
To The Verdicts

The State's attempts to show this error was harmless are futile.

To begin, the State

blindly claims that "[ a]ny prejudice from the jury hearing most of the past criminal charges was
drastically reduced when Reyes clarified on re-direct that the state had dismissed all of the
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charges except interfering with a witness."

(Resp. Br., p.17 (citing Tr., p.607, Ls. I 0-21 ).)

Never mind that, seconds later, Mr. Topmiller, the prosecutor in this case, told the jury, "[w Jell,
there's a reason the charge was dropped." (Tr., p.608, Ls.10-25.) The State goes on to assert
that any "residual prejudice" from that error did not matter because it "presented overwhelming
evidence of Mr. Reyes's guilt." (Resp. Br., p.18.) The entirety of this argument is irrelevant, as
the question is not whether a hypothetical jury would have convicted Mr. Reyes. 9 (See Resp.
Br., pp.18-20.)
To be sure, the State never explains how the erroneous admission of evidence of the
alleged 2015 altercation generally, as opposed to evidence of the criminal charges specifically,
did not contribute contribute to the verdict. (See Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) That omission isn't
surprising given that this pure propensity evidence-beginning with the purported
"impeachment" and ending with Mr. Topmiller's blatant attempts to secure a conviction by
unethical and impermissible means-undoubtedly contributed to the verdicts in this case.
Regardless, the State's failure to even make that argument requires reversal.

State v. Hill,

161 Idaho 444, 450 (2016) (citing Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598-99 ("The State fails to meet its
burden of proving harmless error if it does not address the subject in its briefing.").

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Ms. Reyes' s Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Because Ms. Reyes Was Available For Trial And Thus Her Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay
In response to Mr. Reyes' s claim that the district court abused its discretion by declaring
Ms. Reyes unavailable, the State essentially repeats the district court's erroneous reasoning that
she was actively avoiding the service of process and the State shouldn't have to bear the risk of
9

The State's harmless error arguments on each of the issues in this case fail for the same reason.
14

whether or not she decided to appear. (See Resp. Br., pp.20-23; Tr., p.363, L.23-p.365, L.9.)
As for harmlessness, the State claims the district court correctly allowed Ms. Reyes to plead the
Fifth Amendment when she appeared for trial the next day (and apparently fails to see why it is
problematic that the district court therefore allowed Ms. Reyes's perjured preliminary hearing
testimony to be read to the jury), it argues Ms. Reyes's preliminary hearing testimony was
"duplicative" of other evidence in the case, even though it was the only evidence directly from
the alleged victim, and it again contends that it presented "overwhelming evidence" of
Mr. Reyes's guilt. (See Resp. Br., pp.24-27.) The State's arguments are unavailing.

A.

Ms. Reyes Was Not Unavailable For Trial, And Thus Her Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay
The thrust of the State's argument on this issue is that a witness who is under defense

counsel's subpoena, who plans to attend trial on the same day that the State plans to wrap up its
case in chief, and who does in fact appear on that day, is ''unavailable" for trial simply because
the State was unable to subpoena her for the correct trial dates. (See Resp. Br., pp.20-24.) This
Court should reject that argument because it doesn't comport with I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A) and defies
logic.
To begin, Ms. Reyes was not unavailable for trial simply because she had been avoiding
the service of process. (See Resp. Br., pp.21-22.) The State, much like the district court, is not
at liberty to simply ignore that defense counsel subpoenaed Ms. Reyes and represented that
Ms. Reyes intended to appear at trial the following day, before the State rested. Merely avoiding
service of process, at the very least under these circumstances, does not make a witness
unavailable. See I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A).
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Next, the State's argument that the relevant question is whether Ms. Reyes was "absent
from the trial" at the very moment that the preliminary hearing transcript was admitted finds no
support in I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A) or logic. (See Resp. Br., p.22.) Rule 804(a)(5)(A) does not say
the witness is unavailable "if not present at trial when the party moves for admission of the
former testimony," but rather if the witness "is absent from the trial or hearing." Nor is the State
correct when it claims that Mr. Reyes's reading of the rule would prevent the court from
declaring a witness unavailable until the very end of the trial. (See Resp. Br., p.22.) Again, the
State is not at liberty to disregard that, in this case, Ms. Reyes was under defense counsel's
subpoena and defense counsel represented that Ms. Reyes intended to appear at trial the
following day.
Finally, the State's argument that the defense subpoena was irrelevant because the State,
as "the statement's proponent," had been unable "by process or other reasonable means" to
procure the witness's attendance, ignores the plain language of the rule. (Resp. Br., pp.22-23
(quoting I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A)) (emphasis added).) That Ms. Reyes was under defense counsel's
subpoena and defense counsel represented that Ms. Reyes would appear the next day amounted
to "other reasonable means" of procuring her attendance. I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A). And the fact that
she appeared the very next day, during the State's case-in-chief, shows just how "reasonable"
those means were.
At bottom, there was simply no reason for the district court to declare Ms. Reyes
unavailable when the State was not going to finish its case-in-chief until the next day, Ms. Reyes
was under subpoena for the next day, and defense counsel represented that she intended to
appear. Ms. Reyes was plainly not unavailable, and thus the district court erred by declaring her
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unavailable because it didn't want the State to bear "the rislc' of whether or not she decided to
appear.

B.

The District Court's Erroneous Decision to Declare Ms. Reyes Unavailable And Admit
Her Preliminary Hearing Testimony Surely Contributed To The Verdicts
The State claims the erroneous admission of Ms. Reyes' s preliminary hearing transcript

is harmless for three reasons, each of which fails to meet its burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that this error did not contribute to the verdicts. See Resp. Br., pp.24-27;
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221.

First, the State alleges the error is harmless because Ms. Reyes later took the stand and
pled the Fifth Amendment. (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) On the merits of that argument, the State
claims that the district court correctly allowed Ms. Reyes to invoke the Fifth Amendment
because her "decision to change teams ... raised the specter of perjury." (Resp. Br., p.25.) To
be clear, the mere "specter of perjury" is not grounds to seek the refuge of the Fifth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself .... "). In tum, if the court correctly allowed Ms. Reyes to plead the
Fifth Amendment as the State argues, there is not a "mere suspicion" that Ms. Reyes' s testimony
was perjured-the testimony that the district court put to the jury was necessarily perjured.
(Resp. Br., p.25 n.6.)
The State also attempts to erect various non-existent procedural hurdles to Mr. Reyes's
argument that the district court's decision to allow Ms. Reyes to plead the Fifth Amendment
compounded the error of declaring her unavailable. The State claims Mr. Reyes "argues on
appeal that the district court erred when it allowed Marina to invoke the Fifth Amendment," but
that Mr. Reyes "did not object to [Ms. Reyes] invoking the Fifth Amendment in the district court
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and thus cannot raise it as an issue on appeal." (Resp. Br., p.24-25.) To be clear, Mr. Reyes has
not raised that error as an issue on appeal. (See App. Br., p.7 (listing the issues on appeal, which
do not include this Fifth Amendment issue).)

Instead, Mr. Reyes addressed the Fifth

Amendment issue only to the extent it goes to harmlessness of the district court's erroneous
decision to declare Ms. Reyes unavailable. (See App. Br., pp.25-26.)
The State similarly claims that Mr. Reyes failed to preserve and waived the argument
that, if Ms. Reyes' s preliminary hearing testimony was perjured, the district court never should
have allowed the State to read it to the jury.

(See Resp. Br., p.25 & n.6.) Just as above,

Mr. Reyes did not raise that as an issue on appeal, but addressed it to show just why its earlier
error of declaring Ms. Reyes unavailable cannot be harmless. (See App. Br., p. 7 (listing the
issues on appeal), 26 (explaining that "[t]he only way Ms. Reyes could have validly invoked the
Fifth Amendment is if she had already perjured herself by testifying falsely at the preliminary
hearing, as her truthful testimony at trial would bear out," and "[i]n that case, the district court
never should have allowed her perjured testimony to be read to the jury.").) The State goes on to
claim that Mr. Reyes "managed to waive this argument not just once but twice because he failed
to cite any rule of evidence (or any authority whatsoever) to support it." (Resp. Br., p.25 n.6.)
To be clear, there is no requirement that a party support each sentence in its brief with "argument
or authority"-that rule applies to "issues." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("When
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not
be considered.").
Second, the State argues that this error is harmless because Ms. Reyes' s preliminary
hearing testimony was duplicative of other evidence.

(Resp. Br., pp.26-27.)

Mr. Reyes

disagrees that the preliminary hearing transcript, which was the only evidence directly from the
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alleged victim herself, is duplicative of the other witnesses' testimony. Regardless, the cases on
which the State relies to support that argument, State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912
(2003), and Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 370 (1983), were decided before this Court 's
decision in Perry, which held that the relevant question is whether the error contributed to the
verdict.

150 Idaho at 221.

Under that standard, even wholly duplicative testimony is not

necessarily harmless.
Finally, the State argues this error was harmless because it presented "overwhelming
evidence" of Mr. Reyes's guilt. (Resp. Br., p.27.) As discussed above, that is the incorrect
standard. (See supra, pp.5-14.) The State has failed to meet its burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that this error did not contribute to the verdicts.

VI.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Reyes' s Judgment Of Conviction Because, Even If These Errors
Are Individually Harmless, Together They Deprived Mr. Reyes Of His Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial
The State admits that the district court committed two errors in this case-by allowing
the prosecutor to tell the jury about Mr. Reyes's 2015 criminal charges related to a fight with his
wife, and by allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that Mr. Reyes was on probation. Yet it
argues that the cumulative errors in this case do not warrant reversal because the State presented
overwhelming evidence of Mr. Reyes's guilt. (See Resp. Br., p.36.) While this argument finds
some support in the caselaw, 10 it turns on a basic misunderstanding of the cumulative error

10

See, e.g., State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[E]ven without the
erroneously admitted evidence, there is overwhelming evidence ofBarcella's guilt. Thus, we are
confident, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the cumulative effect of these errors did not contribute
to Barcella's conviction or otherwise affect his substantial rights. The jury would have reached
the same result regardless. Accordingly, we reject Barcella' s cumulative error claim.")
(emphasis added).
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doctrine. Under the cumulative error doctrine, relief is warranted if the trial was unfair; the
question is not whether the appellate court thinks the defendant is guilty or innocent. See State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007). Indeed, guilt or innocence is wholly irrelevant to the
question of whether the process of convicting the defendant was fundamentally fair.

See

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945) ("Even those guilty of the most heinous
offenses are entitled to a fair trial."). An appellate court's belief that the defendant was, in fact,
guilty does not make an unfair trial "fair" in retrospect.
Mr. Reyes's trial was fundamentally unfair because the errors in this case, including the
two errors conceded by the State, painted Mr. Reyes as a bad person, a wife-batterer, a repeat
offender, and someone who is feared by those who know him. Given the pervasiveness of these
themes throughout the trial, and their pernicious tendency to sway the jury's deliberations, the
above errors together deprived Mr. Reyes of due process and a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reyes respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21 st day of February, 2020.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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